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A Theory of Industry-Level Activity for Understanding the Adoption of
Interorganizational Systems
Robert B. Johnston
Department of Information Systems
University of Melbourne
Melbourne VIC 3010 Australia
Abstract-Increasingly we wish to ask and research questions
about the adoption of interorganizational systems and
electronic commerce at the industry level but are hampered by
the lack of a theory of concerted purposeful action at this large
level of analysis. In this paper we give the outlines of such a
theory and indicate the uses to which it can be put. Particular
attention is paid to how the routine day-to-day activities of the
firms and support organizations that make up an industry
group can be coordinated in such a way that we can speak of an
industry as engaged in purposeful activity. We contend that
only through a deep understanding of the possibilities and
nature of routine coordinated activity at this level can issues
concerning promotion, implementation and adoption of
interorganizational systems by whole industries be properly
framed.

I. I NTRODUCTION
At this stage of maturity of inerorganizational systems
(IOS) and electronic commerce (EC) research, one would
like to ask questions such as: Why have certain industries
been able to adopt electronic commerce technologies to
reform supply chain management while others have not?
What conditions within an industry particularly favour
adoption of EC? What are the points of leverage that can be
exploited to help an industry in the introduction of EC? Yet
when we try to turn such questions into research agendas we
are hampered by the lack of theory that can account for
action at this broad level of analysis. Interorganizational
systems research has dealt with the issues that arise when
systems cross corporate boundaries, the difficulties of
partnerships, and so forth, but has tended to focus on a
limited scope of interorganizational interactions, often pairwise. But what the above questions demand is a theory of the
concerted activity of a large group of firms and support
organizations, which includes firms in the direct value
chains, infrastructure providers, regulators, and trade
organizations, who have a business interaction focussed on a
particular product.
Discussing purposeful activity at the industry level
presents some new theoretical challenges. Although the
practice has been criticised [1], in the case of organizational
activity it is to some extent possible to associate
organizational intentions with those of a powerful individual
such as the CEO and to assert that such a person’s view of
activity can act as a shared view for the organization. Given
the discrete corporate identities of the players at the industry
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level, it is much more difficult to assert that any player’s
intentions and visions stand for those of the industry group
as a whole or that day-to-day practices of individual
organizations are in any simple sense mediated by such
shared goals and visions. In addition, the organizational
group, is at least in principle constituted, to cooperate in the
achievement of the focal task as a way of achieving certain
economies of scale, whereas, in free market economies the
fundamental interaction of companies is competition. These
considerations demand more careful attention to the
possibility and nature of concerted purposeful activity at this
large unit of analysis.
In this paper we make a start at constructing such a theory
of industry-level activity, with the ultimate objective of
explaining the diffusion, adoption and operation of supply
chain electronic commerce technologies. Space only allows a
theoretic exposition: early application of the theory can be
found elsewhere [2-4]. We want to make as explicit as
possible what the commitments of the theory are and why
they have been made. Thus, the method we have chosen is to
use the meta-theoretical framework put forward by Markus
and Robey [5] to discuss theories of the impact of IS upon
organizational change. This allows us to be quite explicit
about the logical structure of the theory, its units of analysis
and our position on causal agency. The commitments we
make are similar to those implicit in Gidden’s structuration
theory which has become popular recently for discussing
implementation of information systems [6-8], but there are
important differences. In fact, the theory we present can be
thought of as a structuration-like theory applied to
organizations as actors within an industry group.
II. CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY
Markus and Robey [5] present a meta-theory of theories of
information systems and technology driven change in
organizations in which they define three principle
dimensions of causal structure of such theories. They are:
1) Causal agency: which “refers to the analyst’s beliefs
about the identity of the causal agent, the nature of causal
action and the direction of causal influences among the
elements in the theory”, [5, p585]. They distinguish between
types of theories where the locus of causation is the
(technological) environment or situation, the focal agent, or
the interaction between environment and agent.
2) Logical structure: which refers to the degree of
extension in time of the relations between cause and effect.
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They distinguish between variance theories (also more
recently called factors theories) which are “concerned with
predicting levels of outcome from levels of contemporaneous
predictor variables” [5, p589], and process theories where
outcomes are assumed to be more properly determined by the
nature of processes that occur over the duration of the
change episode.
3) Level of analysis: which refers to the type of social
entities (individuals, organizations, society, or a mixture of
these), which are the main concern of the theory and form
the atomic analytical units of the theory.
The theory put forward here is explicitly a multi-level,
interactional, process theory. These commitments are very
much interconnected and are elaborated in the following
sections. These dimensional settings essentially define the
theory as being of a certain generic type. We will also need
to specify an additional set of commitments concerning the
nature of activity that define it as a particular theory.
A. Levels of analysis: analytical units
Since our goal is a theory of the intentional activity of
industries, our primary unit of analysis is the industry group.
We make the usual split between this unit as a focal actor
and its environment. However, to explain concerted activity
at the industry level we find it necessary to speak of the
situated actions of individual members of this group and how
these become coordinated. Therefore, we must include
individual firms and organizations as lower level actors in
the analysis. Again we make the split between these actors
and their environment and find that the latter consists of the
broader industry environment plus a more immediate
environment consisting of the industry as a whole. We are
thus led to a rather unusual three level theory. These
analytical constructs are defined thus:
1) Individual industry units. These are the firms and
organizations that contribute to the operations of the
industry. Examples are: firms directly associated with the
value chain of the product specific to the industry, that is,
manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers;
infrastructure providers such as transport providers, financial
institutions, software providers, and communications
providers such as VANs; regulatory organizations such as
trade organizations, standards bodies, and industry related
research organizations. These firms and other organizational
entities are the smallest grain-size entities of the theory. We
consider actions and intentions to be attributable to the units
rather than to particular persons in them;
2) The industry group itself. This consists of the
individual industry units plus the system of relations between
them. These relations, which will be described in more detail
below, are what makes the collection of units greater than
the sum of its parts, and therefore worth speaking about as
an entity to which coordinated activity can be attributed. An
important challenge of the theory is to show how industry

group action is related to industry unit activity. Since we
have included not just the firms directly adding value to the
focal product of the industry but also any other organizations
supporting these activities, our notion of industry group is
rather similar to Porter’s notion of “industry cluster” [9].
This industry group is also the immediate environment of
the individual units;
3) The remote environment. This consists of all firms,
organization, institutions, and other factors at a larger scale
than the industry, that affect the firms and organizations of
the industry and the relations between them. Examples are:
government policies, economic conditions, competing
industries, foreign exchange rates, foreign competition,
technological change, physical environment and geography.
The distinction between the immediate unit environment
and the remote extra-industry environment needs some
clarification. The defining characteristic of the remote
environment is that although it constrains and enable certain
actions of the industry units, these characteristics are not
substantially affected by the actions of these units acting
individually or in consort. An example is the appearance of
the Internet as a communication technology. Although this
has had a great effect on the practicality of EDI in certain
industries [10], it would be hard to argue that the actions of
any specific industry grouping have shaped the nature of the
core design and protocols of the Internet. Such shaping
forces occur at a larger scale than particular industries.
Another example is government policy which, in the case of
the Australian automotive industry, has had profound effects
on its adoption of EDI [11]. But these policies were largely
shaped by events on the international scale and by ideologies
not derived from the automotive industry itself. Finally, the
physical environment of the industry shapes what can be
done in that industry. For instance, the feasibility of Just-InTime delivery is affected by geographical remoteness, but is
hardly influenced by the industry itself.
By contrast the immediate environment, what is taken to
be the industry at large, is defined here to be all those firms
and organizations whose actions both enable and constrain
the actions of individual firms but are also themselves
influenced by the industry units through mutual interaction.
We will explore the detailed nature of this interaction in later
sections. For example, while the nature of the Internet at the
large scale is not substantially a response to the needs of
particular firms or industries, these needs, and the business
opportunities they afford, have directly given rise to certain
Internet-based EDI software products [2,10,12]. So such
software providers have an effect on the activities of industry
firms and are also affected by these activities. Thus they
must be considered to be within the immediate environment
of the industry units as defined above, and also to be units of
the broader industry group. The defining characteristic of the
industry group, and thus the immediate environment of the
units, that we have in mind is this mutual interaction of all
the parts, that is, a certain kind of closure by virtue of the
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powerful or so weak that their interaction with other units is
hardly reciprocal. There will also be units whose interaction
with each other is constrained by corporate ties and vertical
integration, such as the distribution and retail functions of
large supermarket chains, so what constitutes the actual
atomic units of the theory may be open to discussion.
Nevertheless, we press ahead with the somewhat simplistic
model of the domain of industry-level activity presented
above, because we are primarily trying to articulate a
conception of how activity at the industry level is related to
activity at the unit level and the consequences of this.
Whether such a model is rich enough to account for all
industry activity phenomena is an empirical question for
future research.

Government
Policy

Fig. 1: The focal industry unit acts in an environment of
the structures of the industry group plus remote influences.
fact that most of the organizations with which any one
organization interacts are also part of the group.
There are some definite assumptions being made here
which should be made explicit. By associating the immediate
environment of individual firms with the group of mutually
interacting units we have assumed that this group of actors
and their interactions essentially constitutes the industry.
There may well be other types of entities that must be
included in a full inventory of the potential influences upon
the actions of units but are not industry units as defined. The
nature of the focal product of the industry, for instance the
need to keep meat refrigerated, might be an example. The
assumption that what happens in some domain can be
explained in terms of the interaction between actors only, is
a consequence of trying to describe the world in intentional
terms, and it is not obvious that everything in the world can
be conceived of as an actor (cf. actor network theory [13]).
Structuration theory also suffers this problem and it is hard
to incorporate the aspects of the world that are not social in
that theory. We have included in the theory a richer mix of
entities in what we term the remote environment partly to
overcome this problem. This is possible because of the more
passive role attributed to the remote environment.
In addition the boundary between the industry group and
its remote environment is somewhat fuzzy. Certain
infrastructure providers and standards organizations might
not be entirely specific to any industry and yet they are
sufficiently influenced by the interests of individual
industries to be considered at least partly within its
boundary. Within the industry group itself there my be units
that deal with the focal product that are so individualistic or
monopolistic that they can hardly be said to be in interaction
with the rest of the industry. There may be units that are so

We take the position that the actions of the industry units
are both constrained and enabled by the existence of certain
relations between them which form the structure of the
immediate industry environment. This notion of structure
plays a similar role in our theory to that of structure in
structuration theory, but is rather more concrete than
Gidden’s ‘rules and resources’ which ‘exist only as memory
traces’ and are ‘instanciated in action’ [14, p377]. Since this
industry structure is in turn the product of the actions of
individual units, actions of the individual units and of the
industry as a group are mutually determining. Thus,
individual units are neither entirely unconstrained by the
industry as immediate environment, nor entirely subsumed
by the industry group as a focal actor. Thus the locus of
causal agency within the industry group is the interaction
between the activities of the individual units and the
networks of relations among the group (its structure). Causal
agency is thus of the emergent type defined by Markus and
Robey. However, because we allow for the existence of a
remote environment whose influence on the industry units is
essentially one way, we allow the possibility that activity of
the industry is to some extent technologically (or more
properly environmentally) determined in Markus and
Robey’s sense (for instance, as in the case of EDI in the
Australian Automotive industry mentioned above). However,
any such determinism is likely to be less linear than in the
simple technologically determinist theories described by
those authors, because the effect of technology on individual
firms in our theory is most likely somewhat indirect via the
effect it has on the nature of possible relations between units
(industry structure).
C. Logical structure
We now take a position on the nature of activity at the
individual and group level which defines the logical
structure of our theory as processual in Markus and Robey’s
classification. We assume that what happens at both a unit
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and group level is detectable as patterns of coordinated
behaviour of units that are reproduced over time. Rather than
the trajectory of industry activity being determined at any
time by the action of a set of environmental or other factors,
we argue that this trajectory is one that is simultaneously
consistent with the constraints imposed by the structure of
immediate and remote environment and with the principle
that this trajectory of activities is what actually constitutes
the industry structure itself. Thus, in both times of stability
and times of change such a trajectory will be difficult to
predict from preceding conditions and understanding the
conditions of its reproduction will require a deep analysis of
the mutual reinforcement of the structure of industry
relations and their interaction with the actions of individual
units over space and time, that is, a processual analysis [15].
To describe in more detail our conception of the principle
of reproduction of inter-organizational activity we need to go
more deeply into the nature of industry level structure and
our particular notion of situated action. This takes the
discussion beyond the generic classification of the type of
theory we propose, to the specific dynamic commitments of
the theory.
III. DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRY-LEVEL ACTIVITY
A. Theory of Activity
To flesh out the dynamical structure of the theory we now
need to take a position on the nature of on-going intentional
or goal directed activity in complex systems. Such positions
have been termed theories of activity by Agre [16,17]. (This
terminology should not be confused with Russian Activity
Theory [18]). A number of author’s [16,17,19-23] from
diverse disciplines have pointed out recently that there are
essential two choices for a theory of activity of intentional
systems: representational / information-processing theories
of activity, and situational / interactional theories of activity.
In the first kind it is assumed that the focal agent (which
would in our case would be the industry) can act in its
environment to achieve desired goal states by means of the
construction and maintenance of a symbolic, abstract
representation of its environment and its state within it,
using data acquired by sensing the environment, and can
determine a series of formal actions capable of taking it from
its current state to the desired state by a process of logical
deduction upon this abstract representation of the world of
action. This series of formal actions is a plan, which is then
implemented in the real world.
Applied to our problem this would require the industry as
a group to be able to construct and share a central and
common representation of its position as a group with
respect to its environment, and to be able to use this shared
representation to deduce and implement an agreed set of
coordinated actions. This vision of industry-level activity, as
with all applications of this type of plan-based activity

theory, would be based on a metaphor of the industry acting
as a conscious, deliberative agent, and is implicit in many
project management approaches to industry reform. We
argue that, although such plan-based, deliberative activity
can be organised on rare occasions, it is quite implausible
that ongoing, day-to-day activities of industry units are
coordinated in this way by reference to a shared
representation of their joint intentions and actions. Thus
while acknowledging the possibility of planned industry
action we seek an alternative explanation of how coordinated
goal-directed actions of industry units occur and are
maintained on an ongoing basis that does not rely on shared
plans.
The second type of theory of activity imagines a focal
agent with simple, possibly purely reactive, responses to its
environmental situation, acting in an environment that is
structured in such a way as to tend to enable certain goal
outcomes. These outcomes are then as much attributable to
the structure of its environment as to the actions of the focal
agent. In these theories the focal agent is not required to be
capable of forming an ”aerial view” of its relation to the
environment, but instead acts on the basis of its direct
perceptions of the environment from its particular situated
“ground view”, and can act with distinctly bounded formal
reasoning powers because the structure of the environment
assumes some of the “cognitive burden” of intentional action
[24,25]. Activity is an interaction between the situated
responses of the focal agent and the structure of the
environment in which it acts, and goal achievement is
emergent from this interaction. The metaphor that
encapsulates this type of activity is that of routine behaviour
in familiar situations. Routines [26] are simple actions that
are both triggered by situations and supported in their goal
achievement by the recurring structure of situations that
elicit them.
We take this type of theory of activity to be the likely
mechanism of ongoing, routinized industry-level activity.
Applied to our problem, we see the trajectory of action of the
collection of individual units, that is activity at the industry
group level, as composed of a collection of relatively simple,
myopic, situated responses of individual units to their
immediately perceived environment. However, this
environment consists both of the remote uninfluenced
environment and the immediate environment consisting of
the network of relations among the units. In such a theory it
is because the immediate environment is reciprocally
determined by the actions of individual units that the
collective trajectory of actions of the units can be said to be
the activity of the industry group. In other words, concerted
activity is attributed to the reciprocal causal effect of the
group upon individual units, rather than to any form of
regular group deliberation about action. We must now
elaborate on the types of structural relationships that can
occur in the industry and the way they might enable and
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constrain the individual situated actions of the units
themselves.
B. Industry Structure
Relations between industry units are influences of one
firm upon another that cause their actions to be correlated or
coordinated. Defining all such relationships between firms at
any time would define the structure of the industry. There
are a number of different types of relations and not all
individual units or types of units are involved in every type
of relation. These include:
1. Trading relations or relations that centre on adding
value to the industry’s focal products. Essentially, one
industry unit is a supplier of goods in such a relation and the
other is a customer. Mapping these pair-wise relations
defines the supply or value chains of the industry.
2. Communicative relations. Units transmit information
concerning actual or planned trading events to certain other
units in order to coordinate action.
3. Economic Relationships. There are a number of
possible economic relations between units:
Competition. Individual industry units compete with other
units for customers or suppliers;
Cooperation. Individual units cooperate with some units
against other units, or to reduce the bargaining power of
customers or suppliers;
Intermediation. Some units intermediate between supplier
and customer. There are trading intermediaries and
infrastructure intermediaries. Trading intermediaries add
value by transforming the product (manufacturers) or by
reducing the cost and risk of trading (distributors,
wholesalers). Infrastructure intermediaries (eg. VANs)
reduce infrastructure costs and risk for firms.
4. Corporate Relationships. The behaviour of units may be
coordinated by being part of the same corporate entity and
subject to its management control. For instance distribution
and retailing, which we would consider to be separate
functions or units of the retail supply chain, are often
combined in supermarket operations. Similarly, units may be
vertically integrated hierarchically. In either case, economic
and power relations will be of a different type and strength
than for units in free market relationships.
5. Power Relations Certain firms can influence the
behaviour of other firms by threats or sanctions. Such
dominance may be based on size, degree of connectedness
with other units, security of value adding niche, and so forth.
Trust, which is often talked about in the context of
interorganizational systems [27], is part of this dimension.
6. Cultural, Normative, or Sense-Making Relations. Firms
are influenced by other firms through appeals to notions of
“good practice”. The influence may be tacitly shared or
formalised by certain regulatory units, such as industry
funded trade bodies or communications standards bodies.

7. Geographical and other physical relations.
Geographical connectivity and proximity is particularly
pertinent to interorganizational reforms in the distribution of
material products, such as Just-In-Time replenishment.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to
present the richness of the relations that exist between the
individuals of a broader industry group. The mapping of the
particular relations present in a particular industry, and their
strengths, would be an important part of understanding
industry-level activity in that industry.
C. Reciprocity of Industry Group Structure and Unit Activity
The activities of individual industry units are both
constrained and enabled by the structure of relations that
exists in the industry. For example, compliance to
communicative standards with other units (a cultural
relationship) enables open entry by firms into the
communication network, but constrains the use or
development of new or individual types of communications
by the firm, which may be important to competitive
advantage.
Conversely, the structure of the relationships that exists in
the industry is constructed from the actions of the individual
industry units. For example, adoption of proprietary
communications standards by a firm compromises
communicative relationships. Communication between firms
may alter power relationships. Adherence to standards
entrenches the power of infrastructure intermediaries.
D. Reproduction of the Structure of Industries
Our main contention about the dynamics of industry-level
activity is that certain types of structural relations tend to be
reproduced as a result of the way they constrain and enable
the situated actions of the individual units. If the group
structural relations created by the situated actions of
individual units are consistent with the possibility of the
individual firms performing these actions without undue
recourse to deliberative planning, then both the structure and
the individual actions will tend to be reproduced over time
and more easily become routinized. This explanation of
group concerted action does not need to appeal to the sort of
explicit
deliberative
coordination
envisioned
by
representational type theories of activity, and is more
consistent with the situated capacities of individual units to
act.
The unfolding of the trajectory of the actions of the
industry units is thus a complex interplay of interactions of
the units with the immediate and remote environment and
the tendency of these actions to confirm and reproduce the
structure of the immediate industry group environment.
Whether this trajectory of action actually fulfils goals
deliberately aimed for by individual units or groups of units,
or by trade organization that purport to represent the interest
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of industries as a whole, is thus an emergent rather than
planned phenomenon under this theory. Goal attaining
industry group behaviour is largely achieved by evolution in
this theory and is explained by the history of unit-group /
structure interactions over time.
There are a number of ways that “desirable” coordinated
industry unit action can be acquired. Industry structures that
benefit individual units, especially powerful ones, tend to be
confirmed and reproduced. Episodes of coordinated group
deliberative action are possible as a way of redirecting group
action trajectories, but the maintenance of the new trajectory
depends on the mutual reproduction of new industry
structures by the new possibilities they afford for situated
actions of individual firms. Because of the proposed myopic,
self-satisficing nature of normal on-going unit action, certain
trajectories of group action which may appear highly
desirable to a hypothetical observer, freed from the network
of interests of the group members, for instance ones that
lower total operating cost substantially through coordinated
group activity, may be difficult to acquire and reproduce as
routine. This is because according to this theory such a
transcendental, “aerial view” of activity is not generally
available to the industry as a group, and is not part of the
principle of reproduction of group activity. It is even possible
that individual activity that is dysfunctional for group
survival could be reproduced for a while. However,
perception of a threat of extinction by units or groups of
units would be a powerful means by which situated firm
actions could be changed in such a way as to disconfirm such
dysfunctional industry structure and result in the evolution of
new structure.
The prospect for desirable change is not as dismal as it
may seem from the above description. An important feature
of the kind of routinized, situated activity envisioned here is
its robustness. This allows for incremental changes to be
adopted and routinized and to then form the basis of more
ambitious changes in a bottom-up fashion. In terms of
planned change, such an image of incremental routinestabilised change holds out a promise for making better use
of difficult deliberative action episodes than a notion of
interorganizational change based entirely on deliberative
planning.
However, there is another important way in which
industry structural relations can be altered leading to new
action trajectories and states of industry coordination: this is
through the effect of changes in the remote environment
upon the viability of certain inter-unit relations. The threat of
extinction by inter-industry or foreign competition has
already been mentioned. Technological changes such as the
appearance of the Internet or economic changes such as
exchange rate shifts could so dramatically change the nature
and viability of certain types of relations between firms that
new trajectories of situated activity are reproduced by the
changed structures. Changes in the remote environment may
well be the most powerful causes of change in industry level

behaviour, given the difficulty of on-going deliberative
coordinated action, and may be a major opportunity for
episodes of intervention.
IV. DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
A. Implications for explanation of change
The theory presented here has a number of important
implications for the explanation of the nature of change and
the feasibility of controlled change of industry level
coordinated behaviour. Firstly, contrary to simplistic
deterministic factors theories, there is no simple relationship
in this theory between a set of environmental factors, which
may include intervention strategy factors, and direct
outcomes. The limited usefulness of factors approaches to
explaining and controlling IS related change within single
organizations is now recognised theoretically and
empirically in the IS literature [5,6], and this work extends
these conclusion to interorganizational change. In the kind
of situational / interactional theory put forward here, the
relationships between events in the environment and actions
of individual units that may act as change agents, and their
long term consequences is less easily predicted. On the one
hand, the robustness of routinized situated activity tends to
make industry practices resistant to perturbations. Thus the
theory presented here gives hope of understanding the nature
of the frequently discussed phenomenon of resistance to
change and the possibility of more principled approaches to
overcoming it. On the other hand the complex web of
interactions including positive feedback loops implied by the
theory can make outcomes sensitive to small changes: small
changes in the remote environments or small deliberate
change actions might produce large and largely
unpredictable changes to practices.
Secondly, the theory suggest that deliberative coordinated
action by an industry as a whole, or units purporting to
represent such a group position, may be severely limited in
effectiveness, and this is certainly consistent with
observation. The situation is even worse than that of change
within a single organization because, while a powerful
person such as the CEO of an organization might
legitimately claim access to the kind of transcendental
“aerial view” of action posited by planning approaches to
change and be able to mobilise action of the basis of it, it is
unlikely that any organization in an industry, including trade
organizations, is sufficiently external to the power interests
and cultural relations of the industry to make such a claim to
an objective outside view. This is why the availability of such
an industry wide representation is not part of the principle of
reproduction of practices posited by this theory. On the other
hand, as pointed out earlier, understanding the nature and
robustness of situated routinized activity provides a
theoretical basis for understanding controlled, incremental,
bottom-up change and the changed role that deliberative
planning might play in it.
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B. Implications for understanding of adoption of
interorganizational systems at an industry level.
The theory has potential application in analysing the
adoption or non-adoption of inter-organizational systems,
such as supply chain electronic commerce and Just-In-Time
replenishment, in whole industries. For instance, some
industries have taken to the use of EDI more readily and
achieved greater levels of EC-compliance than others. Why
is this so? The theory suggest several possibilities. One is the
importance of changes in the remote environment in
destabilising existing industry structures and routines and
creating the opportunity for new ones or the amplifying the
effectiveness of deliberative intervention. The Button Plan to
radically improve the efficiency of the Australian automotive
industry led to profound changes in relations among players
in that industry, including improved cooperation between
assemblers and parts suppliers, creation and strengthening of
trade bodies and normative links including a unique uniform
industry-wide approach to EC, creation of a niche for a
government VAN, and near 100% EDI compliance of all
trading partners [11,28]. Similarly, the appearance of the
Internet as a new communication technology with new
forms-based communication protocols has assisted large
players in the retail industry to achieve 100% compliance
and consequent supply chain wide distribution reforms. One
of us [2] has argued that this was not simply due to direct
characteristics of the new technology, but rather to a
profound reshaping of the relations between a number of
parties involved, including traders, infrastructure providers
and regulatory bodies, allowing a new vision to emerge of
mixed traditional and radical types of EDI in a more
comprehensive network of communicative relations between
sophisticated and unsophisticated trading partners, and a
new distribution of costs and benefits among them. By
contrast, the routine situated activities of units in some
industries, such as the Australian Meat Industry [3,4], may
be such as to effectively reject the possibility of improvement
through EC-coordinated activity.
The essence of electronic EC-enabled interorganizational
systems is that great efficiencies in the handling of materials
can be achieved with low technology provided that the
activities of participating organizations are coordinated
through frequent, computer-to-computer communication.
Achieving these high levels of coordination often requires
some organization to incur extra costs, for instance by being
prepared to handle smaller replenishment orders or
becoming EDI-capable, or to assume greater risk by being
prepared to operate with smaller buffer stocks. At the same
time it is not clear that all parties will share equally the
efficiencies
achieved.
Therefore,
adoption
of
interorganizational systems usually involves renegotiation of
trading arrangements to equalise the distribution of costs,
benefits and risks between trading partners [29]. The present
theory begins to explain why this is such a barrier to their

adoption: the normal on-going activity of the industry does
not make use of explicit representation of the overall
industry practices upon which such negotiation might be
based, so such representations or models have to be build in
ad hoc episodes of concerted deliberation which are foreign
to the normal modus operandi of the industry units. The
severity of this barrier to industry wide reform is seen much
more clearly from a situated action perspective than from
naive positions that implicitly assume a representation theory
of activity and conflate reasoning about action with action
itself.
C. Methodological implications for research
The theory suggest that the appropriate way of studying
the adoption of interorganizational changes within industries
is to trace, by empirical research, the relations of various
types that exist between the various types of individual units,
the way in which these relations are constructed and
maintained through the situated actions of the units, and the
ways in which these structures together with remote
environmental factors enable and constrain individual firm
action and thus industry wide initiatives. Preliminary
attempts to do this for diverse industries can be found in [2]
and [3]. The theory presented here can thus act as a
framework for principled analysis of case studies of
interorganizational systems adoption. It can additionally
provide a source of research agendas in much the same way
as proposed by Orlakowski [6] for structuration theories of
IS-enabled organizational change.
V. CONCLUSION
A number of important new ideas have been introduced in
this paper. The first is simply the notion of using a whole
industry as a unit of analysis in discussing EC adoption.
While the diffusion of EC has been discussed previously,
often the focus is on adoption by individual firms with the
assumption that adoption by a critical mass of firms leads to
industry wide adoption. The new focus on the industry as an
actor raises the possibility of discussing industry
characteristics that are favourable to EC adoption, or crossindustry comparisons of EC adoption. The second is the
provision of a framework for discussing the concerted action
or agency of the industry group, with a specific proposal
about how such concerted action can be related to the
individual situated actions of the group members. Finally,
the paper applies a structuration-like theoretical framework
to a larger unit, the industry group, than has previously been
done.
The theory presented here came out of discussions about
the different levels of uptake of EC technologies in different
industries [4] and also from an analysis of the way the
Internet has destabilised the traditional vision of EDI [2].
Many of the ideas are tentative and we need to analyse in
detail the interactions and causal influences on firms that

search

exist in one or more industry sectors and verify that our
theoretical constructs, particularly the division between
immediate and remote environment, are adequate to explain
the phenomena. This work is under way.
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